Cuban Missile Crisis Final Agreement

Cuban Missile Crisis Final Agreement

On October 19, EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the options for airstrikes and blockades, and in the afternoon, most EXCOMM supporters moved to the blocking option. Reservations about the plan were expressed on 21 October, the main concern being that the Soviets, once the blockade came into force, would rush to complete some of the missiles. As a result, the United States could bomb operational missiles if the blockade did not force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles already on the island. [68] In August 1962, the United States suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. This month, its secret services gathered information on the observations of ground observers of Russian-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different sites. Cia Director John A. McCone was suspicious. Sending anti-aircraft missiles to Cuba, he argued, “made sense only if Moscow intended to use it to protect a ballistic missile base directed at the United States.” [25] On August 10, he wrote a memo to Kennedy, in which he suspected that the Soviets were preparing the introduction of ballistic missiles to Cuba. [8] The President also visited national television this evening to inform public opinion about developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and impose a “quarantine” and the possible global consequences if the crisis continues to worsen. The tone of the president`s statements was stark and the message is clear and reminiscent of Monroe`s doctrine: “It will be the policy of this nation to consider any nuclear missile fired from Cuba against a nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union against the United States that will require a full retaliatory measure against the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status for DEFCON 3 when U.S.

naval forces began implementing quarantine and plans for a military attack in Cuba were accelerated. The enormity of the world`s proximity to the thermonuclear war led Khrushchev to propose a vast easing of tensions with the United States. [144] In a letter to President Kennedy on October 30, 1962, Khrushchev described a series of courageous initiatives aimed at avoiding the possibility of a new nuclear crisis, including the proposal of a non-attack treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, and even the dissolution of these military blocs, a treaty to end all nuclear tests and even eliminate all nuclear weapons. , solution to the question of the “hot-button” of Germany by East and West which formally accepts the existence of West and East Germany, and the recognition by the United States of the government of mainland China.

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